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THE POTENTIAL FOR REDUCING INFLATIONARY PRESSURES BY REFORMING GOVERNMENT REGULATION 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum, Director 
Center for the Study of American Business 
Washington University 
Numerous government activities, often unwittingly, generate inflationary pres-
sures or otherwise interfere with the attainment of important national goals unrelated 
to the specific activities. These unwanted side-effects occur in good measure because 
government policymakers frequently tend to ignore the effects of government programs 
on productivity, capital formation, innovation, employment, and inflation. 
For example, government imposition of socially desirable requirements on business 
through the regulatory process appears to be an inexpensive way of achieving national 
objectives. It costs the government little and is no significant burden on the tax-
payer. But, the public does not escape paying the cost. Every time that the Environ-
mental Pt~otection Agency imposes a more costly, albeit less polluting, method of 
production, the cost to the consumer of the resultant product will tend to rise. 
Similarly, each time that the Consumer Product Safety Commission sets a standard 
which is more costly to attain, some product costs will tend to increase. 
The monetary authorities could offset the inflationary effects of regulation by 
attempting to maintain a lower rate of monetary growth. In practice, however, public 
policy makers tend to prefer the higher rate of inflation to the additional monetary 
restraint and the resulting decreases in employment and output. Also, to the extent 
that real resources are devoted to low-payoff activities, economic welfare is re-
duced.1! The loss of the potential increases in productivity from such diversion 
eliminates a possibility of offsetting ordinary factor cost increases and thus 
exacerbates the inflation problem. 
It is not inevitable, of course, that every regulatory activity increase infla-
tionary pressures. In those instances where regulation generates social benefits 
Note: The author is indebted to Roland McKean and Lee Benham for numerous useful 
insights and helpful suggestions. 
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(such as a healthier and thus more productive work force) in excess of the social 
costs imposed by the government action, inflationary pressures should be reduced. 
The point being made here is that many forms of governmental intervention in the 
private sector involve heavy costs and that, with some care and concern, the regu-
latory process might be revised so as to achieve comparable benefits at lower costs. 
Indeed, the central purpose of this paper is not to propose the general elimination 
of regulatory programs but to indicate some of the more promising approaches to reduc-
ing their inflationary consequences. 
Adverse Impacts of Government Regulation of Business 
Regulation and Inflation 
There are a variety of ways, direct and indirect, in which the operation of 
governmental regulatory programs contributes to an exacerbation of the inflation prob-
lem. In some cases, the impact is direct and visible to all. A striking case in 
point is the passenger automobile, where the federal government has mandated a wide 
array of specified safety and environmental features to be incorporated by the manu-
facturer. In the case of the so-called interlock system, the public outcry became 
so intense that the Congress overruled the regulators, eliminating the requirement. 
Other types of government regulation may be indirect but equally costly. Several 
research efforts examining building regulations have documented repeated instances of 
increases in the price of housing due to building codes. A study at Rutgers Univer-
sity tentatively concluded that overly stringent or outdated codes increase housing 
costs by somewhere between 5 and 10 percent of total unit costs.~ Several scholars 
have estimated the effects of land-use controls on the cost of residential housing. 
Although the analyses vary in methodology and data, they generally conclude that 
there is a weak to moderate, but uniformly positive, relationship between single 
family housing costs and land use controls in developing areas.~ 
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In many other ways, government regulation increases the overhead cost of pro-
ducing goods and services. The rapidly rising paperwork burden furnishes a striking 
case in point. One large corporation, the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, is re-
quired to file approximately 1,000 reports annually to 35 federal agencies including 
the Federal Power Commission, the Federal Energy Administration, the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, and the Small Business Administration. Duplication inevitably occurs. The 
company must report its oil and gas reserves, with each report taking slightly dif-
ferent form, to the FEA, the FPC, the FTC, and the U.S. Geological Survey. It re-
quires 636 miles of computer tape to store the data that the company must supply to 
the Federal Energy Administration. In total, Indiana Standard has 100 full-time 
employees whose work is centered around meeting federal regulations, at an annual 
cost of about $3 million. 4/ 
Employee fringe benefit costs are increasing as a result of new pension regula-
tions. Some portion of advertising costs results from the requirements imposed by 
· affirmative action programs in the equal employment opportunity area. More indirect-
ly, it is likely that productivity is affected by the variety of regulations that are 
designed to improve the quality of the work environment. To the extent that the regu-
lations reduce accidents and absenteeism they do indeed contribute positively to out-
put and thus economic welfare. 
But in practice the emphasis has shifted to essentially "bureaucratic" concerns. 
More forms are now filled out. More safety rules are posted. More inspections take 
place. More fines are levied. But, no significant reduction in industrial accident 
rates has resulted. Table 1 contains the latest available data on accident rates 1n 
American industry. It can be seen that the experience for 1973 (the first year of 
operation of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration) was not any more 
favorable than for 1972, the year prior to the advent of OSHA. 
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Table 1 
Recordable Occupational Injury and Illness Incidence Rates for Selected Comparable 
Industry Divisions, Private Nonfarm Sector, United States, 1973 and 1972 
Incidence rates per 100 full-time workers1 
Total recordable Lost workday Nonfatal cases without 
Industry cases cases lost workda~s 
1973 1972 1973 1972 1973 
Private nonfarm sector2 11.0 10.9 3.4 3.3 7.6 
Transportation and public utilities3 10.5 10.8 4.6 4.5 5.9 
Wholesale and retail trade 8.6 8.4 2.7 2.8 5.9 
Finance, insurance, and real estate 2.4 2.5 .8 .8 1.6 
Services4 6.3 6.1 2.0 2.0 4.3 
1 The incidence rates represent the number of injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time 
workers, and were calculated as: (N/EH) x 200,000, where 
N = number of injuries and illnesses 
EH = total hours worked by all employees during calendar year 
200,000 = base for 100 full-time equivalent workers (working 40 hours per week, 50 
weeks per year) 
2 Includes oil and gas extraction which is not a component of the industry divisions 
listed. Other mining activities are not included. 
-
3 Excludes railroads (SIC 401). 
4 Includes agricultural services, forestry, and fisheries (SIC 07-09). 
Source: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, Occupational Injuries and 
Illnesses by Industry, 1973, 1975, p. 2. 
1972 
7.6 
6.3 
5.6 
1.7 
4.1 
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In the case of the job safety program, as in numerous other areas of government 
involvement, the important original concern of the public and the Congress has been 
converted to the practice of not violating the rules and regulations. 11 You won•t get 
into trouble if you don•t violate the safety standards, .. is the response, even if as 
many accidents occur as before. The emphasis shifts to such trivia as raising and 
answering these types of questions: How big is a hole? When is a roof a floor? 
How frequently must spittoons be cleaned? The results in terms of the safety objec-
tive are almost invariably disappointing. Yet, the reaction to this situation is 
virtually predictable: redouble the existing effort -- more rules, more forms, more 
inspections, and thus higher costs to the taxpayer and higher prices to the consumer. 
Regulation and Innovation 
A hidden cost of government regulation is a reduced rate of innovation. The 
longer that it takes for a new product to be approved by a government agency -- or 
the more costly the approval process -- the less likely that the change will be made. 
In any event, innovation will be delayed. 
A recent case is the new asthma drug beclomethasome dipropionate (BD). Although 
this drug has been used successfully by millions of asthma patients in England, it 
still has not received approval of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. BD is de-
scribed as a safe and effective replacement for the drugs which are now administered 
- to chronic asthma patients, but without the adverse side effects of the drugs in use 
in the United States. Unlike BD, the steroids currently prescribed in this country, 
such as prednisone, can stunt growth in children, worsen diabetes, increase weight 
through water retention, and cause bone softening. The delaying procedures of the 
FDA are preventing Americans from switching to the safer product, BD. 5/ 
Professor Sam Peltzman of the University of Chicago estimates that the 1962 
amendments to the Food and Drug Act are delaying the introduction of effective drugs 
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by about four years, as well as leading to higher prices for drugs. 6/ As a result 
in good measure of the more stringent regulation, the United States was the 30th 
country to approve the anti-asthma drug metaproterenol, the 32nd country to approve 
the anti-cancer drug adriamycin, the 51st country to approve the anti-tuberculosis 
drug rifampin, the 64th country to approve the anti-allergenic drug cromolyn, and 
the 106th country to approve the anti-bacterial drug co-trimoxazole.ZI 
The regulators really seem to have the private sector scared. In August 1975, 
the National Cancer Institute reported that the solvent trichlorethylene, known as 
TCE, may be a possible cause of cancer. TCE at the time had been used in decaffei-
nated coffee. It seems that the government used a rather generous dose of the chemi-
cal on the test animals. It was the equivalent of a human being drinking 50 million 
cups of decaffeinated coffee every day for an entire lifetime. It would seem that 
the consumer's bladder would give out or he or she would drown before having to worry 
about getting cancer. But what was the industry's reaction? To laugh at this example 
of governmental nonsense? Hardly. With the cyclamate episode still firmly in mind, 
one major producer quickly changed to another chemica1. 8/ 
Examples of obvious inefficiencies or trivia in regulation of business are not 
hard to come by. 91 .Capable, intelligent and well-meaning administrators delegating 
decisions to capable, intelligent and well-meaning subordinates cannot specify in 
advance all of the correct or desirable exceptions to general rules. Upon examina-
tion, the reported examples of regulatory nonsense often do not turn out to be mere 
- flukes. They are almost an inevitable result of the rapid expansion of the scope and 
variety of regulatory functions that has occurred in the United States in recent 
years. 101 
The adverse effect of regulation on innovation may be felt more strongly by 
smaller firms and thus have an anti-competitive impact. According to Dr. Mitchell 
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Zavon, president of the American Association of PoisQn Control Centers: 
"We•ve got to the point in regulatory action where it•s 
become so cos~ly and risky to bring out products that' 
only the very largest firms can afford to engage in these . 
risky ventures. To bring out a new pesticide you have to 
figure a cost of $7,000,000 and seven years of time ... .!.!/ 
Regulation and Capital Formation 
Federal regulation also affects the prospects for economic growth and productivity 
by levying a claim for a rising share of new capital formation. This is most evident 
in the environmental and safety areas and its importance can be observed quite readily. 
An examination of the flow of capital spending by American manufacturing com-
panies just prior to the recent recession is quite revealing. In 1969, the total 
new investment in plant and equipment in the entire manufacturing sector of the 
American economy came to $26 billion. The annual totals rose in the following years. 
But when the effect of inflation is eliminated, it can be seen that four years later, 
in 1973, total capital spending by U.S. manufacturing companies was no higher. In 
11 real terms, .. it was approximately $26 billion in both years. 
That is not the end of the story, however. In 1973, a much larger proportion of 
capital outlays was devoted to meeting government regulatory requirements in the 
pollution and safety area-- $3 billion more, to be specific. 121 Hence, although 
the economy and its needs had been growing substantially in those four years, the 
real annual investment in modernization and new capital had actually been declining. 
The situation was worsened by the accelerated rate at which existing manufacturing 
facilities were being closed down because the rapidly rising costs of meeting govern-
ment regulations meant that they were no longer economically viable. About 350 
foundries in the United States have been closed down during 1971-1974 because they 
could not meet requirements such as those imposed by the Environmental Protection 
Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 131 This may help to 
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explain why the American economy, for a substantial part of 1973, appeared to lack 
needed productive capacity, despite what had been large nominal annual investments 
in new plant and equipment in recent years. 
The governmental dec·ision-making process can have other adverse effects on capi-
tal formation by introducing uncertainty about the future of regulations governing 
the introduction of new processes and products. An example is furnished in a 
November 1975 report of a task force of the President•s Energy Resources Council 
dealing with the possibility of developing a new synthetic fuel industry. In 
evaluating the impact of the. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 
the task force reported, 11 lt would be next to impossible at this time to predict 
the impact of these requirements on synthetic fuels production ... 14/ 
With reference to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, the task force 
stated that the major uncertainty was not whether a project would be allowed 
to proceed, but rather the length of time that it would be delayed pending the 
issuance of an environmental impact statement that would stand up in court. The 
task force pointed out, 11 The cost of such delays (construction financing and inflated 
raw materials and labor costs) is an obvious potential hazard to any synfuels pro-
ject ... ~ 
In evaluating the overall impact of government regulatory activity, the task 
force concluded, 11 In summary, some of these requirements could easily hold up or 
permanently postpone any attempt to build and operate a synthetic fuels plant ... 161 
Regulation and Employment 
Government regulation, albeit unintentionally, can have strongly adverse effects 
on employment. This has been demonstrated in the minimum wage area where teenagers 
have increasingly been priced out of labor markets. One recent study has shown that 
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the 1966 increase in the statutory minimum wage resulted by 1972 in teenage employ-
ment in the United States being 320,000 lower than it otherwise would have been. 
As a result of that one increase in the compulsory minimum wage, the youth unemploy-
ment rate in 1972 was 3.8 percentage points higher than otherwise would have been 
the case. 171 
In the construction labor area -- where unemployment rates are substantially 
above the national average -- government regulation also acts to price some segment 
of the work force out of competitive labor markets. Under the Davis-Bacon legisla-
tion, the Secretary of Labor promulgates "prevailing" wages to be paid on federal 
and federally-supported construction projects. A variety of studies has shown that 
these federally-mandated wage rates are often above those that actually prevail in 
the labor market where the work is to be done. 181 
Perhaps although only to a minor degree, the equal employment opportunity pro-
gram may tend to increase unemployment by delaying the filling of job vacancies. To 
the extent that employers must undergo protracted job searches prior to hiring em-
ployees, the average length of unemployment is likely to be longer. It is not un-
common for a position to remain unfilled despite the presence of an adequate labor 
supply at market prices because the governmental regulatory requirements have not 
been met. 
Regulation and Entrepreneurial Functions 
One of the immeasurable impacts of government regulation relates to the basic 
entrepreneurial nature of the private enterprise system. To the extent that manage-
ment attention is diverted from traditional product development, production, and 
marketing concerns to meeting governmentally-imposed social requirements a signifi-
cant but subtle socialization of corporate activity may result. 
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In theemployeepension area, for example, the recently-enacted pension regulation 
has shifted much of the concern of the management of the pension funds from maximiz-
ing the return on the contributions to following a more cautious approach of minimiz-
ing the likelihood that the fund managers will be criticized for their investment 
decisions. It thus becomes s~fer -- although not necessarily more desirable to the 
employees covered -- for the pension managers to keep more detailed records of their 
deliberations, to hire more outside experts (so that the responsibility can be di-
luted), and to avoid innovative investments. 191 
It may be difficult to appreciate the extent of the detail and minutia of the 
government regulation which is imposed on private sector activities. It is 
instructive to examine the Federal Register, the official publication which contains 
the rules and regulations promulgated by federal agencies. The January 16, 1976 
issue is dominated by the 94 pages of tables which contain the minimum wage rates 
for federal and federally-assisted construction established by the Secretary of Labor 
under the Davis-Bacon Act. 
Of the remainder of the January 16 Register, a major item relates to the orange 
juice standards of the Food and Drug Administration. This section ranges from the 
types of equipment which are deemed acceptable to measure the color of orange juice 
to the number of points required (36 to 40) for canned orange juice to qualify as 
being of "good color." This fascinating portion of the Register is followed by 
lemon regulation 22, which restricts the number of lemons which may be shipped from 
California and Arizona during the period January 18-24. Another FDA regulation then 
describes the handling of dried prunes. 
Several of the other items in the January 16 Register may be of somewhat greater 
importance. They deal with standards on school bus brakes, procedures for making 
rural housing loans, advertising for eye glasses, subsidies for local railroad 
service, and the amount of notice that must be given if a drawbridge is required to 
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be open. Not all of the items in the January 16 Register necessarily impress the 
casual reader as being those matters of high national policy which the Founding 
Fathers presumably had in mind in forming a more perfect union. 
Approaches to Regulatory Reform 
A new way of looking at the microeconomic effects of government programs is need-
ed. A parallel can be drawn to macroeconomic policymaking, where important and at 
times conflicting objectives are recognized. Attempts at reconciliation or trade-
off are made, such as among economic growth, employment, income distribution,and 
price stability. 
At the programmatic or microeconomic level, it is also necessary to reconcile 
the goals of specific government programs with other important national objectives, 
which are not now in practice the concern of many of those agencies. Healthy working 
conditions are an important national objective, but surely not the only one. And 
society has no stake in selecting the most costly and disruptive methods of achiev-
ing a higher degree of job safety. A similar situation occurs in relating environ-
mental protection, product safety, and other regulatory efforts with such important 
practical concerns as the cost to the consumer, the availability of new products, and 
the efficiency of productive activity. 
One method of broadening the horizons of government policymakers and administra-
tors is through the device of the economic impact statement. The requirement that 
they consider the costs and other adverse effects of their actions as well as the 
benefits should .be imposed on the economic regulatory commissions as well as on the 
regulatory activities of the other departments and agencies. Economic impact state-
ments also should be required of procurement and subsidy programs which contain regu-
latory features. 
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This is not a plea for the elimination of government regulation, but rather for 
reducing where possible the inflationary and other undesirable consequences. The 
theoretical rationale for this moderate approach was provided by Professor F. A. 
Hayek in his Constitution of Liberty: 
..... a free market system does not exclude on principle .. . 
all regulations governing the techniques of production .. . 
They will normally raise the cost of production, or what 
amounts to the same thing, reduce overall productivity. 
But if this effect on cost is fully taken into account 
and it is still thought worthwhile to incur the cost to 
achieve a given end, there is little more to be said 
about it. The appropriateness of such measures must be 
judged by comparing the overall costs with the gain; it 
cannot be conclusively determined by appeal to a geDeral 
principle."20/ 
In a more specific way, the same point was made by a leading liberal legislator. 
Senator Hubert Humphrey has provided a very cogent example of the shortcomings of 
the existing regulatory approach: 
"The government goes around willy-nilly making decisions 
of consequence. There was no estimate of the economic 
impact of the Occupational Safety Act, for example. I 
happen to be for the occupational safety program, but 
what were its economic implications? Did anyone think 
that through? No. "?11 
The policy formation process needs to proceed beyond merely another set of so-
called inflation impact statements. First of all the costs and the benefits need to 
be more than examined; they should be weighed one against the other. In the process 
the actual or proposed regulations that generate excessive costs should be modified 
or eliminated. But we need .to go beyond the direct impact on price, and include the 
relationship to productivity, capital formation, and innovation. 
Relating Costs to Benefits 
In November 1974, President Gerald Ford did instruct the federal agencies under 
his jurisdiction to examine the effects of the major regulatory actions that they 
would be taking on costs, productivity, employment, and other economic factors 
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(Executive Order 11821). Although a useful step forward, there are severe shortcom-
ings in this effort. First of all, many of the key regulatory agencies-- ranging 
from the Consumer Product Safety Commission to the Federal Trade Commission -- are 
so-called .. independent agencies, .. which are beyond the President's purview. 
Even in the case of the regulatory activities which come within the President's 
jurisdiction, the new policy is limited to the regulations which, in the issuing 
agency's own estimation, are "major ... In any event, the agencies covered by the 
Executive Order are only required to examine the economic aspects of their actions. 22/ 
A broader approach seems to be warranted, in the fashion of the current environmental 
impact statements. 
The society is now supposed to examine the impact on the environment of the 
various major actions that it takes. Would it not also be appropriate to require 
each federal, state, and local environmental agency to assess the impacts of its ac-
I 
tions on the society as a whole, and particularly on the economy? Surely a cleaner 
environment is an important national objective. But it is not the only national ob-
jective. Certainly the nation has no stake in selecting the most expensive or most 
disruptive ways of achieving its environmental goals. 
Much would depend on the "teeth" that would be put into the required economic 
impact statement. Merely legislating the performance of some economic analysis by 
an unsympathetic regulator would primarily delay the regulatory process and make it 
more costly~. But limiting government regulation to those instances where the total 
benefits to society exceed the cost would be a major departure. It could signifi-
cantly slow down if not reverse the current rising trend of federal regulation of 
business. 
To an economist, government regulation should be carried to the point where the 
incremental benefits equal the incremental costs, and no further. (Indeed, this is 
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the basic criterion which is generally used to screen proposed government invest-
ments in physical resources.) Overregulation-- which can be defined a situation 
where the costs exceed the benefits -- should be avoided. But if policymakers tend 
to ignore or downplay the costs, we are bound to operate in the zone of overregula-
tion, which is likely where we are today. 
In making decisions on which regulations to adopt, the governmental decision-
making body should pay particular attention to several "overhead" types of areas that 
are often neglected -- the monitoring costs by the government itself, the informa-
tion costs imposed on both the public and private sectors, and the related private 
costs of compliance and/or avoidance. It is hardly coincidental that, simultaneous 
with the recent expansion of governmental regulatory activity, the cost of legal 
departments and of legal services has been one of the most rapidly growing segments 
of company budgets. 
It is also important to build into the governmental processes those incentives 
which would encourage government officials to give greater weight to the costs and 
other side-effects generated by the actions that they take. Limiting new regula-
tions to those instances where it can be demonstrated that net benefits accrue to 
society as a whole is one such device. At the operational level, attention might 
be given to the use of the budget process as an added tool of management of regula-
tion. In those cases where the cost-benefit analyses produced by an agency did not 
turn out to be an accurate representation of the effects of a regulation-- i.e., 
where an agency•s regulations in practice generate more costs than benefits -- its 
budget for the coming year would be reduced, and vice versa. 
The wide dissemination of the data on the economic impacts of government regula-
tion might serve to alter the balance of interest group forces now exerted on the 
decisionmaking process. At the present time, it often appears that the interest 
groups which would benefit from the regulation are well aware of those positive con-
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. tributions and thus mobilize their forces in favor of greater regulation. But the 
information on the adverse consequences of regulation, if widely distributed, might 
generate countervailing interest group pressures. 23/ 
Reorganization of Regulation 
The effort, however, needs to proceed beyond mere statistical analysis. It 
should also cover the question of reorganizing the wide variety of regulatory agen-
cies that has been established. During the past decade there has been a rapid ex-
pansion of federal regulatory agencies. Newcomers to the federal bureaucracy include 
the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Environmental Protection Administration, 
the Federal Energy Administration, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 
As shown in Table 2, the expenditures of the major federal regulatory agencies 
came to almost $2.8 billion in the fiscal year 1976. This is a 48 percent increase 
over the costs of these regulatory activities in fiscal 1974. It is apparent that 
the biggest regulatory budgets are not those for the traditional industry-specific 
regulatory commissions, such as the ICC ($50 million) or the CAB ($85 million). 
Rather, the largest proportion of the funds is devoted to the broader, industry-wide 
regulatory activities of the Department of Labor ($397 million, mainly for wage and 
hour standards and job safety), Agriculture ($381 million, largely for food inspec-
tion), and the Federal Energy Administration ($208 million). 
A consolidation of the numerous federal regulatory agencies may now be desirable. 
Each of these regulatory agencies was created at a different time and usually to 
further one specific objective -- a cleaner environment, healthier working conditions, 
safer products, etc. Legislative mandate in hand, each agency pursues its individual 
tasks, as it sees them. Yet increasingly achieving one agency's objective may 
frustrate if not negate the performance of another. The Environmental Protection 
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Table 2 
Types of Federal Regulatory Activities 
Fiscal year 1976. In millions of dollars. 
Area and Agency 
Consumer Safety and Health 
Department of Agriculture 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
Department of Justice 
Department of Transportation 
Department of the Treasury 
Consumer Product Safety Commission 
National Transportation Safety Board 
Subtotal 
Job Safety and Other Working Conditions 
Department of the Interior 
Department of Labor 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
National Labor Relations Board 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 
Subtotal 
Environment and Energy 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Federal Energy Administration 
Subtotal 
Financial Reporting, etc. 
Cost Accounting Standard Board 
Council on Wage and Price Stability 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Subtotal 
Amount 
$ 381 
189 
171 
234 
320 
37 
10 
1,342 
79 
397 
60 
70 
6 
612 
54 
208 
262 
2 
2 
49 
53 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Industry-Specific Regulation 
Civil Aeronautics Board 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
Federal Communications Commission 
Federal Maritime Commission 
Federal Power Commission 
Federal Trade Commission 
International Trade Commission 
Interstate Commerce Commission 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Renegotiation Board 
Subtotal 
Grand Total 
Source: Budget of the U.S. Government for the Fiscal Year 1976. 
85 
11 
50 
8 
36 
· 45 
10 
50 
198 
5 
498 
2,767 
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. Agency encourages the conversion of powerplants from coal to less polluting fuels 
su~h as natural. gas and then the Federal Energy Administration urges the shift back 
to coal, which is the relatively more plentiful fuel. Examples abound of overlapping 
jurisdictions and cross-cutting objectives -- job safety versus elimination of dis-
crimination, a quieter workplace versus a cleaner workplace, clean air versus clean 
water, etc. 
For example, the desulfurization of coal -- to reduce air pollution -- requires 
a combination with lime. But doing that generates large quantities of solid waste 
calcium sulfate. Disposing of calcium sulfate in turn creates water pollution 
problems. Another example relates to federal food standards which require meat-pack-
ing plants to be kept clean and sanitary. Surfaces that are easiest to clean are 
usually tile or stainless steel. But tile and stainless steel are highly reflective 
of noise. They may not always meet the standards set for occupational safety and 
health. 
Perhaps an organizational structure can be developed which encourages better com-
munication among the regulators and, especially, the reconciliation of conflicting 
objectives within the governmental mechanism. Such action might permit a greater 
degree of .. internalizing" the benefits and costs that arise from the regulatory pro-
cess. Moreover, such attempt at reconciliation would be performed in the government 
itself, and hopefully prior to the issuance of regulations. That could help to re-
duce the situations where business firms and individuals are caught in the 
crossfire of conflicting government regulations. 
General Attitudes Toward Regulation 
More basically, however, it is attitudes that need to be changed. The experience 
under the job safety program provides a striking point. Although the government's 
safety rules, regulations, and requirements have resulted in literally billions of 
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dollars in public and private outlays, the basic goal of a safer work environment has 
. 
not been achieved. 
A more satisfying answer requires a basic change in approach to regulation, and 
one that is not limited to the job safety program. Indeed, that program is used here 
merely as an illustration. If the objective of public policy is to reduce accidents, 
it should focus directly on the reduction of accidents. Excessively detailed regula-
tions often are merely a substitute for hard policy decisions. Rather than issuing 
citations to employers who fail to fill out the forms correctly or who do not post 
the correct notices, the emphasis ought to be placed on those employers with high 
and rising accident rates, perhaps levying fines on those with the worst safety re-
cords. (Variable insurance rates may perform a similar function). As the accident 
rates decline toward some sensible average standard, the fines could be reduced or 
eliminated. 
But the government should not be concerned with how a specific company achieves 
the objective of a safer working environment. Some may find it more efficient to 
change work rules, others to buy new equipment, and still others to retrain workers. 
But that is precisely the kind of operational business decisionmaking that government 
should avoid, but which now dominates so many of thes~ regulatory programs. Without 
diminishing the responsibility of the employers, the sanctions under the federal 
occupational safety and health law should be extended to employees, especially those 
whose negligence endangers other employees. The purpose here is not to be harsh, but 
~ to set up effective incentives to achieve society's objectives. This can be a pre-
ferred alternative to government specifying the details of what it considers to be 
.. acceptable .. private action. 
Any realistic appraisal must acknowledge that important and positive benefits 
have resulted from many of the government's regulatory activities -- in terms of less 
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pollution, fewer product hazards, ending job discrimination, and achieving other 
" 
socially desirable objectives of our society. 
It should also be realized that these federal programs were established by the 
Congress in response to a surge of rising public expectations about corporate per-
formance. Although business executives rarely talk or write in terms of the costs 
and benefits of their actions to society as a whole, they often are aware of that 
basic justification for governmental intervention. The president of Chrysler 
furnished a cogent example in justifying governmental automobile pollution controls: 
..... a large part of the public will not voluntarily spend 
extra money to install emission control systems which will 
help clean the air. Any manufacturer who installs and 
charges for such equipment while his competition doesn•t 
soon finds he ts losing sales and customers. In cases 
like this, a Government standard requiring everyone to have 
such equipment is the only way to protect both the public 
and the manufacturer ... 24/ 
But the .. externalities" generated by federal regulation need not justify govern-
ment•s attempt to closely regulate every facet of private behavior. 
Alternatives to Regulation 
The promulgation by government of rules and regulations restricting or prescrib-
ing private activity is not the only means of accomplishing public objectives. As 
Roland McKean has pointed out, codes of behavior which are adhered to on a voluntary 
basis may often be effective. 251 That approach may have special application at the 
present time. The recent revelations concerning misdeeds by corporate executives in 
their dealings with various government officials are leading to pleas for tighter 
regulation of such business behavior. But given the almost universal public outrage 
which has resulted, it is most likely that the prevailing norms of corporate behavior 
are being changed substantially -- and voluntarily -- so as to avoid repeating the 
episodes which have proven so damaging both to the individuals and to their organiza-
tions. 
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, .. 
Government itself has available to it numerous powers other than regulation. 
Through its taxing authority the government can provide strong signals to the market. 
i 
!For example, rather than promulgating detailed regulations governing allowable dis-
1 
lcharges into the nation's waterways, the government could levy substantial taxes on 
,those discharges. Such sumptuary taxation could be 11 progressive 11 , to the extent 
that the tax rates rise faster than the amount of pollution emitted by an individual 
polluter. Thus, there would be an incentive to concentrate on removing or reducing 
the more serious instances of pollution rather than dissipating environmental clean-
up efforts as is often the case at the present time. 
j Using taxation is not meant to punish polluters, or even to give them a 11 license 11 
!to pollute. Rather it would be an effort to utilize the price system by encouraging 
I 
1 producers and consumers to shift to less polluting and thus more economical ways of 
·! producing and consuming goods and services. The basic concept is simple: most 
) 
! 
: people do not pollute because they get positive pleasure from dirtying the environ-
! 
jment. Rather they pollute because it often is easier or cheaper than not polluting. 
I 
; By changing basic incentives through the tax-price mechanism, individuals and 
; organizations (both public and private) would be encouraged voluntarily to alter 
! their economic behavior in a manner which is more conducive to the goals of the 
society. Perhaps most important would be the shift in public-private relationships 
from the current adversary position to a more neutral and efficient mode of conduct. 
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